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ABSTRACT
We present Shi3ld, a context-aware access control framework
for consuming the Web of Data from mobile devices.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.5 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Online In-
formation Services
1. INTRODUCTION
The Web is evolving from an information space for sharing
textual documents into a medium for publishing structured
data. Recent developments in the Semantic Web field lever-
age on the RDF uniform data model and on URIs to merge
and identify structured data of heterogeneous nature. The
Linked Data1 initiative aims at fostering the publication and
interlink of data on the Web, giving birth to the Web of Data,
an interconnected global dataspace where data providers pub-
lish their content publicly [6].
In this paper we describe Shi3ld2, an access control frame-
work for querying RDF datastores in mobile environments.
The open nature of current Web of Data information and the
consumption of web resources from mobile devices may give
providers the impression that their content is not safe, thus
preventing further publication of datasets, at the expense
of the growth of the Web of Data itself. Access control is
therefore necessary, and mobile context must be part of the
access control evaluation. For a comparison with the related
work [1, 5, 7, 8], see [3].
We protect RDF stores by changing the semantics of incom-
ing SPARQL queries, whose scope is restricted to triples
included in accessible Named Graphs only [2]. We determine
the list of accessible graphs by evaluating pre-defined access
policies against the actual mobile context of the requester.
Beyond the support for context in control enforcement, our
proposal has the advantage of being a pluggable filter for
generic SPARQL endpoints, with no need to modify the end-
point itself. We adopt exclusively Semantic Web languages
and reuse existing proposals, thus we do not add new policy
definition languages, parsers nor validation procedures. We
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provide protection up to triple level. Our work does not
provide yet another context ontology: our model includes
base classes and properties only, as we delegate refinements
and extensions to domain specialists, in the light of the
Web of Data philosophy. For the time being, our frame-
work assumes the trustworthiness of the information sent
by the mobile consumer, including data describing context
(e.g. location, device features, etc). We do not provide any
privacy-preserving mechanism yet, although we are aware
that sensible data such as current location must be handled
appropriately.
2. THE FRAMEWORK
The access control model is built over the notion of Named
Graph [2], thus supporting fine-grained access control policies,
including the triple level. We rely on named graphs to avoid
depending on documents (one document can serialize several
named graphs, one named graph can be split over several
documents, and not all graphs come from documents. The
model is grounded on two ontologies: S4AC deals with core
access control concepts and PRISSMA focuses on the mobile
context. The main component of the S4ACmodel is the Access
Policy which defines the constraints that must be satisfied
to access a given named graph or a set of named graphs. If
the Access Policy is satisfied the data consumer is allowed to
access the data. Otherwise, access is denied. The constraints
specified by the Access Policies concern the data consumer,
the device, the environment, or any given combination of
these dimensions. We express Access Conditions as SPARQL
ASK queries. Each Access Policy is associated to an Access
Evaluation Context, an explicit link between the policy and
the actual context data used to evaluate the Access Policy.
The Shi3ld framework adopts PRISSMA which provides classes
and properties to model core mobile context concepts, but is
not meant to deliver yet another mobile contextual model:
instead, well-known Web of Data vocabularies and recent
W3C recommendations are reused. We agree on the widely-
accepted proposal by Dey [4] and, more specifically, on the
work by Fonseca et al.3. The mobile context is seen as an
encompassing term, an information space defined as the sum
of three different dimensions: the mobile User model, the
Device features and the Environment in which the action is
performed.
An example of Access Policy associated to a Read privilege
is shown in Figure 1a. The policy protects the named graph
:alice_data and allows the access to the named graph only
3http://bit.ly/XGR-mbui
:policy1 a s4ac:AccessPolicy; 
           s4ac:appliesTo :alice_data; 
           s4ac:hasAccessPrivilege [a s4ac:Read];
           s4ac:hasAccessConditionSet :acs1.
:acs1 a s4ac:AccessConditionSet; 
        s4ac:ConjunctiveAccessConditionSet;
        s4ac:hasAccessCondition :ac1,:ac2.
:ac1 a s4ac:AccessCondition; 
       s4ac:hasQueryAsk
       """ASK {?context a prissma:Context. 
               ?context prissma:user ?u. 
               ?u foaf:knows ex:alice#me.}""".
:ac2 a s4ac:AccessCondition; 
       s4ac:hasQueryAsk
       """ASK {?context a prissma:Context. 
               ?context prissma:environment ?env. 
               ?env prissma:based_near ?p. 
               FILTER (!(?p=ex:ACME_boss#me))}""".
ACCESS POLICY
RESOURCE TO PROTECT
ACCESS PRIVILEGE
ACCESS CONDITIONS
TO VERIFY
(a)
THE CONSUMER'S
CONTEXT
THE USER DIMENSION
THE DEVICE DIMENSION
THE ENVIRONMENT 
DIMENSION 
:bobCtx{
:ctx1 a prissma:Context; 
        prissma:user :usr1;
        prissma:device :dev1; 
        prissma:environment :env1.
:usr1 a prissma:User; 
        foaf:name "Bob";
        foaf:knows ex:alice#me.
:dev1 a prissma:Device; 
        soft:deviceSoftware :dev1sw. 
:dev1sw a soft:DeviceSoftware;
          soft:operatingSystem :dev1os. 
:dev1os a soft:OperatingSystem;
          common:name "Android".
:env1 a prissma:Environment; 
        prissma:motion "no";
        prissma:nearbyEntity :ACME_boss#me;
        prissma:currentPOI :ACMEoffice. 
:ACMEoffice a prissma:POI;
              prissma:poiCategory example:Office; 
              prissma:poiLabel example:ACMECorp.
}
(b)
Figure 1: The Access Policy protecting :alice_data (a) and
Bob’s sample mobile context in TriG notation (b).
if the consumer (i) knows Alice, and (ii) is not located near
Alice’s boss. Figure 1b visualizes a sample mobile context
featuring all the dimensions described above. The user, Bob,
knows Alice and is currently at work, near his and Alice’s
boss. Bob is using an Android device and is not moving.
Our Access Control Manager is designed as a pluggable
component for SPARQL endpoints. As mobile consumer
query the SPARQL endpoint to access content, context data
is sent with the query and cached as a named graph using
SPARQL 1.1 update language statements. Each time a
context element is added we use an INSERT DATA, while we
rely on a DELETE/INSERT when the contextual information
is already stored and has to be updated. Summarizing, the
mobile client sends two SPARQL queries: the first is the
client query to the datastore, the second provides contextual
information (e.g. Figure 1b). The client query is filtered
by the Access Control Manager instead of being directly
executed on the SPARQL endpoint. The Access Control
Manager selects the set of policies affecting the client query,
i.e. those with a matching Access Privilege. The Access
Conditions (SPARQL ASK queries) included in the selected
policies are executed. For each verified policy, the associated
PREFIX bibo: <http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/>
SELECT * 
WHERE {?review a bibo:Article}
(a)
PREFIX bibo: <http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/>
SELECT * 
FROM :peter_reviews  
WHERE {?review a bibo:Article}
NAMED GRAPH
ACCESSIBLE BY 
THE CONSUMER
(b)
Figure 2: Bob’s SPARQL query (a) and the secured one (b).
named graph is added to the set of accessible named graphs.
The client query is sent to the SPARQL endpoint with the
addition of the FROM clause(s). Query execution is therefore
performed only on the accessible named graphs, given the
consumer contextual information. The result of the query is
returned to the consumer.
An example of client query is shown in Figure 2a, where
Bob wants to access all the datastore (including Alice data)
from the context described in Figure 1b. The Access Condi-
tions included in the policies are evaluated against the actual
context data of the mobile consumer.In our example, the
identification of the named graph(s) accessible by Bob returns
only the graph :peter_data. Alice data is forbidden because
Access Conditions evaluation leads to a false answer with
Bob’s context (Bob is near Alice’s boss). The Manager adds
the FROM clause to constrain the execution of the client query
only on the allowed named graph. The “secured” client query
is shown in Figure 2b. For the implementation details of
Shi3ld and its evaluation, see [3].
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